Chapter Fourteen
From Dalton to the Etowah
For the most part, the early months of 1864 passed leisurely for the Army of Tennessee. There was little fear that the Federals would leave their warm quarters in Chattanooga to assault Dalton. This gave Joe Johnston exactly what he needed: time to rebuild the army. Although some of the stragglers had stumbled back into camp, the army was a far cry from what it had been at the beginning of the Chattanooga Campaign. As winter turned inevitably towards spring, Johnston knew that his army, indeed all of the South, would be tested like never before.
The wear of army life which Cleburne referred to in his proposal was displayed when a Private Hale of the 1st Arkansas Regiment was caught deserting. What perhaps pained the general the most was the fact that the deserter was from his old brigade. However, duty was duty and the execution was carried out in front of the entire division. Despite its gloomy beginning, the day finished cheerily enough. A heavy snowfall that began the previous night prompted several companies from Polk’s and Govan’s Brigades to toss snowballs at each other. Soon, both brigades were drawn up in battle lines and kept up the snowballing for an hour. It ended with an armistice between the two brigades and an agreement to attack Lowrey’s and Granbury’s unsuspecting camps. Sam Watkins recalled:
Brigades and divisions were soon involved, and such a scene was never before witnessed on earth. Many thousands of men were engaged in a snowball battle. It begun early in the morning, generals, colonels, captains and privates were all mixed up. Private soldiers became commanders and the generals were simply privates, and the usual conditions were reversed. The boys had captured the generals' horses and swords and were galloping through the flying snowballs giving orders and whooping things up generally. Verbal orders to different portions of the field were sent on flying steeds.
While leading Polk’s Brigade in a charge, Cleburne was captured and required to take the oath that he would not fight again. Shortly after this, the general violated his parole and led Polk’s Brigade in another charge. Captured a second time, a mock court was held to decide what to do. While deliberating, a soldier called out, “Arrest that soldier and make him carry a rail!” At the end of the day, Cleburne rationed whiskey to the division; bonfires were lit and the troops sang “at the top of their lungs”. (1)
In preparation for the coming campaign, Cleburne arranged for the expansion of the sharpshooting squad. Sixteen Kerr Rifles from the arsenal in Macon Georgia and thirty Whitworth Rifles, which ran the blockade from England, were added to this elite unit. Now totaling 48 men, Cleburne selected Lieutenant A.B. Schell of the 2nd Tennessee to lead them.
While Cleburne was busy at headquarters writing reports as well as letters to Miss. Tarleton, he was ordered to take his division to the relief of General Polk in Alabama. Polk, with 9,000 men, had been forced to retire from Mississippi because he was outnumbered by Sherman’s army of 20,000. On February 12, Sherman was in Meridian, Mississippi and called for reinforcements from General William Sooy Smith, then in Memphis. Whether Sherman’s objective was Selma, Montgomery, Mobile, or if it was a move to divert Confederates from Dalton in preparation of an assault from Chattanooga by Thomas is unknown. Hearing of the diverting of Hardee’s Corps, Grant ordered Thomas to move forward “to gain possession of Dalton, and as far south of that as possible”. On February 21, Forrest, with 2,500 cavalry, met Smith’s troops near Okolona, Mississippi and drove him back to Memphis; Sherman abandoned his campaign and returned to Vicksburg. On the 23, Thomas’ troops pushed Wheeler’s Cavalry back from their positions in front of Tunnel Hill, Georgia. Placing his artillery in Cleburne’s old camp, Wheeler was able to hold this “commanding position” until reinforcements arrived. Hardee’s Corps was ordered to return immediately from Alabama and to “Lose no time”. On the morning of the 25, Hindman skirmished with two Federal divisions under Generals Crufts and Baird at Mill Creek Gap on Rocky Face Ridge and repulsed an assault upon his left late that afternoon. Granbury’s Texans, the first brigade to return from Alabama was rushed into position at Dug Gap, four miles south of Mill Creek Gap, where Confederate pickets had been driven in earlier in the day. Johnston wrote:
That gallant officer executed these instructions with the intelligent courage he always exhibited in the presence of the enemy. The appearance of a part of his brigade on the crest of the mountain, at a point commanding the Gap, and that of another in front at the same time, dislodged the Federal troops before sunrise, and they abandoned the ground with a precipitation that amused the Texans greatly.
That next morning, Thomas returned his troops to Chattanooga. (2)
Before the campaign began, Cleburne obtained a twelve-day pass to see Miss Tarleton. “He has scarcely been back a month”, wrote Buck to his sister on March 3. “Would not be surprised at another wedding soon.” Not stopping at Nash’s, Cleburne went directly to Mobile. “After keeping me in cruel suspense for six weeks” wrote Cleburne, “she has at length consented to be mine and we are engaged.” (3)
On March 9, Grant was promoted to lieutenant general and given command of all Federal armies. He conferred with Sherman regarding a plan to capture Richmond and Atlanta. Sherman recalled, “He was to go for Lee and I was to go for Johnston”. (4)
With the transfer of Polk’s men to the Army of Tennessee, the number of effectives rose from 42,000 men to 60,000. These men were placed in defensive positions around the gaps in Rocky Face Ridge, west of Dalton. The Confederate’s numbers were still dwarfed in comparison to Sherman’s 100,000 troops. Sherman divided the command of these troops among Generals Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield for maximum mobility.
While waiting for Sherman to attack, Cleburne devised a plan to strike the enemy first. Following orders, William Allen, adjutant of the 5th Tennessee Cavalry brought 100 men with him to the top of Rocky Face Ridge at dawn on April 16. Allen met the general who pointed down the ridge that separated the two armies. “Do you see that smoke down in Dogwood Valley?” Cleburne asked. Replying in the affirmative, the general instructed Allen to take his cavalry down the ridge and charge the enemy’s camp. “General” Allen asked, “How many Yankees is down there?” Replying that it was an entire brigade, the adjutant said, “I can do nothing with a brigade. I have only one hundred men.” Cleburne said, “You can charge them and scatter them; and when they turn on you, you can out run them”. With some doubts, Allen took his cavalrymen down the ridge, raising a Rebel Yell as they entered the enemy’s camps. Allen recalled, “They were at breakfast. They sure did scatter. They had a fine breakfast and I had trouble to hold a guard in line. Soon they rallied and chased us up the side of the mountain, wounding two men and several horses.” As soon as they reached the top, Cleburne ordered the cavalrymen to “File right.” Having placed about a regiment of infantry at the top, the perusing Federals were met with a volley of lead as soon as they crested the ridge. (5)
On May 5, Johnston received word that the Federals were advancing in force from Chattanooga. The enemy skirmished with Wheeler’s Cavalry all day in front of Tunnel Hill. Resuming the advance at daybreak on the 7, the Federals advanced slowly, annoyed by the fire from the dismounted cavalry. Finally, about noon, Wheeler was driven from the entrenchments and the Federals went into camp just beyond the range of Confederate cannons on Rocky Face Ridge.
The Federals drove the pickets through Mill Creek and Dug Gaps the next day. Johnston quickly sent reinforcements. Taking both Lowrey’s and Granbury’s brigades from camp near Dalton, Cleburne hastened his troops towards Dug Gap for a rematch with Hooker’s Corps.
Cleburne wrote:
I arrived there after a rapid march, which was rendered very severe by the extreme heat of the summer and the steep acclivity of the ridge, about an hour before sundown. Reaching the gap (Dug Gap) in person, while my command was still at the foot of the ridge, I found the First and Second Arkansas Cavalry, dismounted, and Grigsby's brigade of Kentucky cavalry holding the position. They had gallantly repulsed every assault.
The lead brigade in the column, Granbury’s, seized the Kentuckians’ horses some distance from the base of the ridge and rode the remaining distance on horseback. They arrived just in time. Outnumbered 4 to 1 and expended of their ammunition, the cavalry had resorted to pushing massive boulders down onto their attackers. Dismounting, Granbury’s men rushed into position along the top of the ridge and opened fire on Hooker’s men. The fight ended near dark as Hooker’s men withdrew from the gap. (6)
It became evident that the force sent against Rocky Face Ridge was only meant to divert troops away from Sherman’s true purpose when Confederate cavalry reported seeing a Federal column passing through unguarded Snake Creek Gap well to the southwest of Rocky Face Ridge. Cleburne was ordered to take his entire division south to Resaca. Of this grave error, Cleburne wrote:
This movement was rendered necessary by the untoward circumstances of Snake Creek Gap not being adequately occupied to resist the heavy force thrown against it, under the sagacious and enterprising McPherson. How this gap, which opened upon our rear and line of communication, from which it was distant at Resaca only five miles, was neglected I cannot imagine. General Mackall, Johnston's chief of staff, told me it was the result of a flagrant disobedience of orders, by whom he did not say. Certainly the commanding general never could have failed to appreciate its importance. Its loss exposed us in the outset of the campaign to a terrible danger, and on the left forced us to retreat from a position where, if he adhered to his attack, we might have detained the enemy for months, destroying vast numbers of his men, perhaps prolonged the campaign until the wet season would have rendered operations in the field impracticable. As it was, if McPherson had hotly pressed his advantage, Sherman supporting him strongly with the bulk of his army, it is impossible to say what the enemy might not have achieved--more than probable a complete victory. But McPherson faltered and hung back, indeed after penetrating within a mile of Resaca he actually returned, because, as I understood, he was not supported, and feared if we turned back suddenly upon him from Dalton he would be cut off, as doubtless would have been the result. (7)
After making sure that an attack was not coming from Snake Creek Gap, Johnston regrouped his army, placing them in defensive positions west of Resaca. Hood’s Corps was positioned on the right, Hardee’s in the center, and Polk’s on the left. Cleburne’s Division was located at Hardee’s center and consequently the Confederate center.
Keeping to his strategy of flanking the Confederates, Sherman prepared his troops to make a strong demonstration against Resaca while at the same time sending General Thomas Sweeny’s division several miles south of the town across the Oostanaula River to get between Johnston and Atlanta. Robert D. Smith wrote on May 13, “Polk’s and Granbury’s Brigades had heavy skirmishing with the enemy this evening…The two armies are now confronting each other and I expect a big fight tomorrow.” The fighting began early the next morning and was concentrated on the flanks. Cleburne wrote:
During the 14th the enemy came into position on the ridge opposite to me, and opened a heavy fusillade. In the course of the afternoon he made several attempts to charge, but uniformly they were unhappy failures. In front of Brigadier-General Govan, one of his officers, supposed to be a general officer, was heard to address his troops, endeavoring to incite them to the charge. He told them amongst other things that they were the men who had taken Missionary Ridge, and that they could take this. But his eloquence was of no avail. His men came but a few paces into the open ground of the valley, when they retired precipitately under our fire.
The division’s sharpshooters played an important role in the battle. Apart from silencing Federal batteries almost 800 yards away, they single-handedly decimated a skirmish line. As night fell, the general firing slackened into a sharpshooter’s contest. (8)
The battle recommenced on May 15 as Federals primarily attacked the Confederate right: Hood’s Corps. As morning turned into afternoon, Hood’s Corps counterattacked and drove the Federal left from their ground. As Johnston was making preparations for a general assault the next morning, he received word from cavalry general Martin that two Federal divisions were crossing the Oostanaula via a pontoon bridge near Calhoun. “Upon this,” wrote Johnston “the idea of fighting north of the Oostanaula was abandoned at once, and the orders to Lieutenant-General Hood were countermanded.” When Robert D. Smith heard the order to fall back, he was disgusted. “We have splendid entrenchments. The best I ever saw and if Sherman will only attack us it will be the ruin of his army for we will give him the worst whipping he ever had, but I am afraid that he will march by us and not accept the offer of battle.” Private Watkins wrote:
Sherman himself is a coward, and he dares not try his strength with old Joe. Sherman never fights; all that he is after is marching to the sea, while the world looks on and wonders: “What a flank movement!” Yes, Sherman is afraid of Minnie balls, and tries the flank movement. We are ordered to march somewhere. (9)
As the army withdrew from Resaca, Cleburne was sent to the aid of an unlikely ally: Walker. A Federal detachment had advanced to the bank of the Oostanaula and was preparing to cross by the right of Walker’s flank in order to threaten Calhoun. At noon on May 16, Cleburne quickly threw forward Polk’s and Granbury’s brigades and placed Govan on their left in echelon. Meanwhile, he ordered Lowrey and four rifled pieced to occupy a hill perpendicular to the river in order to enfilade the enemy’s line as they crossed. Cleburne wrote:
Polk became briskly engaged with the enemy's skirmishers after advancing but a short distance. The rifle pieces on the hill opened upon the enemy's right, enfilading his line. This fire seemed to throw him into great confusion. It was entirely unexpected. It would doubtless have proved very destructive, but, unfortunately, before I had had time to fire more than a very few rounds a dispatch was sent me from my pickets that the enemy was coming upon Calhoun, driving Wheeler, with his cavalry, steadily before him. Receiving orders in view of the exposure of my rear to this force, I withdrew my brigade and passed the creek.
Having stalled the Federal’s advance, the division marched wearily on, arriving at daylight in Adairsville where they collapsed into bivouac. (10)
Johnson hoped to make a stand south of Adairsville where his map depicted the heights on either side of the Oothcaloga Creek Valley. As Cleburne placed his division on the southern range of these hills, Federal courier carrying a flag of truce rode up with a message from General Sweeny, a native of County Cork Ireland. Accepting the invitation, Cleburne and Sweeny met at headquarters. The Federal off-handedly proposed that after the war was over, Cleburne and he should raise an army to liberate Ireland. Cleburne replied that after the war, he believed that both of them would have had enough fighting to last them the rest of their lives. Aide-de-Camp Mangum recalled of his Irish opponents, Cleburne’s “high integrity revolted at the want of consistency and morality shown in the course of that class of Irish who, invoking the sympathies of the world in behalf of ‘oppressed Ireland’, gave the powerful aid of their arms to enslave another people”. (11)
When Johnston saw the Oothcaloga Creek Valley, he was disappointed. The valley was much wider and swampier than had been shown on the map and it placed the troops at a great disadvantage. Continuing his policy of standing of the defensive, Johnston ordered his army to fall back to Cassville. Perhaps the greatest benefit in the short stand at Oothcaloga was a much-needed 18-hour rest.
Despite these retrograde movements towards Atlanta, morale stayed high. Robert D. Smith expressed his belief that “Johnston will carry them almost if not quite to the Ohio river”. “Our having to fall back has not dampened the spirits or ardor of any”, wrote another. “We have inflicted heavy loss upon the enemy whenever he has given us a chance, while we have lost comparatively few.” (12)
“The probability that the Federal army would divide—a column following each road—gave me a hope of engaging and defeating one of them before it could receive aid from the other” contemplated Johnston as he studied the roads out of Adairsville leading to Cassville. One road followed the route of the Western & Atlantic railroad as it wound through Kingston to the southwest then curved in an easterly direction past Cassville. The second was a direct route to Cassville and ran through open country where an attack was favorable. At its widest point, where the indirect route ran through Kingston, the distance between the roads was about 10 miles over “crooked country roads”. With this in mind, the army began their march early on the 18: Hardee’s Corps marching via Kingston, Polk’s and Hood’s the direct route. (13)
Later that morning, Sherman arrived in Adairsville where he found “the plain, well-marked trail of the enemy” on the Kingston road. Arriving in Kingston that day and the next, they were surprised to find no trace of Johnston’s army. Sherman proposed that the Confederates had simply crossed the Etowah south of town--despite the fact that all bridges were still in tact. As Sherman’s corps searched the country between Kingston and Cassville for the vanished Confederate army, they nearly made a grave error. Scouts reported a Federal column, later identified as Hooker’s, marching into a trap to the left of Hood and in front of Polk. Although Johnston was unaware that Sherman was unaware of the Confederate’s positions, he immediately ordered Hood and Polk to attack the vulnerable column. Hood refused the order and held his position, allowing the Federals to retreat to safety. (14)
Although Hardee believed that a stand should be made north of the Etowah River, Polk and Hood disagreed, claiming that they could not hold their ground effectively. Johnston uneasily assented to the move and ordered the army to cross the Etowah. After the war, he would say it was a move, “I have regretted ever since”. (15)
Sources
1: Confederate Veteran 1893 Page 10
: Article found at www.americancivilwar.50megs.com/stories04.html
2: Narrative of Military Operations: chapter 9 page 282
: Ibid: page 183
: Stonewall of the West: chapter 10 page 197
: Narrative of Military Operations: page 285
3: Dear Irvie, Dear Lucy: page 218
: Ibid
: Stonewall of the West: chapter 10 page 198
4: Lone Star General: page 71
5: Pat Cleburne Confederate General: Chapter 13 page 178
: Ibid
: Ibid
: Ibid
: Ibid
: Ibid
6: Cleburne’s report of actions from Dalton to the Etowah: O.R XXXVIII part 3 pages 720-21
7: O.R XXXVIII part 3 pages 720-21
8: Robert D. Smith: pages 126-127
: O.R XXXVIII part 3 pages 720-21
9: Narrative of Military Operations: chapter 11 pages 313-314
: Robert D. Smith: pages 126
: Co. Aytch: chapter 12 page 130
10: O.R XXXVIII part 3 pages 720-21
11: A Meteor Shining Brightly: chapter 8 page 205-206
12: Robert D. Smith: pages 128
: Southern Invincibility A History of the Confederate Heart by Wiley Sword: Chapter 24 page 250
13: Narrative of Military Operations: chapter 11 pages 313-320
: Ibid
14: Pat Cleburne Confederate General: Chapter 13 page 186
15: Pat Cleburne Confederate General: Chapter 13 page 188